Page 374-389

HDQRS. LEFT WING, SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS,Saint Louis, Mo., November 25, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor herewith to submit my report of the operations of this command during the campaign in Georgia, from its commencement up to and including August 19, at which time I was compelled, on account of wounds that day received, to relinquish the command.

On the 29th day of April, 1864, the command, consisting of the Second and Fourth Divisions, and First Alabama Cavalry, Sixteenth Army Corps (excepting the Third Brigade of the Fourth Division, which was left at Decatur, Ala.) moved east, the Second Division, Brigadier General T. W. Sweeny commanding, moving from Pulaski, Tenn., and Athens, Ala., the Fourth Division, Brigadier General J. C. Veatch commanding, from Decatur, Ala., with orders to concentrate at Huntsville, Ala.

From Huntsville, May 2, the command moved along the main road toward Stevenson, Ala., until May 4, when the command embarked on cars for Chattanooga, Tenn., the Second Division from Larkinsville, and the Fourth Division from Woodville. The transportation and artillery of the command, except one battery to each division taken on cars, was sent by land on main road to Chattanooga, via Bridgeport, under escort of the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry and a portion of the First Alabama Cavalry, under command of Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Philips, Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry.

The entire command reached and debarked at Chattanooga on the morning of May 5, and with three day's rations in haversacks immediately marched out on the Rossville road. The Second Division, in advance, bivouacked at Gordon's Mills, on Chickamauga Creek, and the Fourth Division at Rossville. The command moved May 7, Fourth Division in advance, on the Tavern road, via Rock Spring Church, and bivouacked near Gordon's Gap, on Little Chickamauga Creek. The Second Brigade, Fourth Division, Colonel (now Brigadier General) J. W. Sprague commanding, was pushed forwarded to seize and hold Ship's Gap, which was accomplished, with slight skirmishing at 9 p. m. May 8, the command, Second Division in advance, moved, by way of Ship's Gap and Villanow, to Snake Creek Gap, which was occupied, and the command bivouacked therein-the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, supported by the Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry, being pushed forward to Sugar Creek Valley, to hold the eastern outlet of the gap. During the night I received orders to move at 6 a. m. May 9, toward Resaca, advancing as far as Rome Cross-Roads, in Sugar Valley, and there await specific orders and instructions, the object of the move, as stated to me, being to demonstrate on Resaca while other troops would cut the railroad north of that place.

At daylight in the morning (May 9) the advance, consisting of the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry and Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry, was attacked by Ferguson's brigade, of the enemy's cavalry.

The Second Brigade of the Second Division was immediately ordered up, and moving forward, promptly drove and routed the enemy. In this engagement the gallant Lieutenant Colonel Jesse J. Philips, commanding Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, was severely wounded.

Upon reaching Rome Cross-Roads I received orders to advance on Resaca, pressing forward until I should succeeded in developing the enemy in line of battle or in his fortifications, and I gained the Calhoun and Dalton cross-roads, one mile west of Resaca, to hold them until one division of the Fifteenth Army Corps should arrive and relieve me. I advanced steadily, meeting with considerable resistance and skirmishing heavily the entire distance to the last-named cross-roads, when the enemy was discovered in line of battle on the Bald Hill, about three-quarters of a mile west of Resaca, and in his works at Resaca. Leaving the Fourth Division at the cross-roads I immediately ordered the Second Division formed in two lines, and, advancing it rapidly, drove the enemy, took possession of the Bald Hill, and held it. My position and that of the enemy and his strength was promptly reported to Major-General McPherson, who soon thereafter arrived on the ground and directed me to send a few mounted men up the Dalton road to reconnoiter the country and find an approach to the railroad in that direction. He also directed me to hold the Bald Hill and cross-roads until the Fifteenth Army Corps arrived. I immediately sent a detachment of eighteen mounted men (all I had left), under Captain Hughes, Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, up the Dalton road. This force struck the railroad about two miles south of Tilton (which they found strongly patrolled by the enemy's cavalry) and succeeded in cutting the telegraph wires and in burning a wood station, reporting to me without loss at dark. About 4 p. m. I received orders to advance my left, the Fourth Division, to the railroad north of Resaca, and hold the Bald Hill with the Second Division. General Veatch was immediately ordered to move, with Fuller's and Sprague's brigades, of his (Fourth) division, massed in close column by divisions, and, forming promptly, he moved rapidly across the west fork of Mill Creek, in plain view of Resaca. The enemy, observing the movement, opened a heavy fire from his batteries upon the column, and also, together with rapid musketry, upon the left of the Second Division, doing, however, but little execution. After having moved the column across the first open field, I received from General McPherson an order directing me to lock well to my right, as the enemy was massing and pressing forward in that direction. Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Fuller led the advance of the column, and, just as he was gaining cover of the woods on the east side of Mill Creek, I received notice that Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Sprague's brigade had been halted, by order of General McPherson, to support the left of the Second Division and hold the space between that division and the Fourth Division. I was with the advanced (Fuller's brigade). The skirmishers had just reported that they were within a short distance of the railroad when the enemy opened fire upon the brigade with a regiment of infantry and a battery in position, directly on our right. I immediately sent orders to Colonel Fuller to charge the battery and swing still farther to the north, under cover of the timber. Before this order was executed I received orders from General McPherson to withdraw the brigade and close upon Colonel Sprague, who was formed on the left of the Second Division. This had to be done in view of the enemy, whose batteries had a point-blank range across the open fields upon the column. Colonel Fuller deployed his brigade under cover of the timber, and, withdrawing by regiments across the open fields, formed in position on the west of Mill Creek. By the time the withdrawal was accomplished it was sunset, and I received orders to withdraw the command and return to Snake Creek Gap. I accordingly withdrew the command and bivouacked, about 12 o'clock at night, at the eastern outlet of the gap. The Sixty-sixth Illinois Infantry skirmished from Snake Creek Gap to Resaca, some eight miles, driving the enemy before them the entire distance without detention to the column. My loss during the day was 29 killed, wounded, and missing. We took some 30 prisoners. An official report, seen some days after in the rebel papers, showed that one of the enemy's regiments at Resaca lost 70 men killed and wounded.

During the entire day the command acted under the personal direction of Major-General McPherson, and promptly obeyed and executed all his orders. My transportation had not as yet reached me. I had with the entire corps, since leaving Chattanooga, only seventeen wagons, and I had marched out in the morning without rations, most of the command having been without food since the day before at noon. Thus a march of sixteen miles was made by the command the men, and animals whereof had nothing to eat for a day and a half.

The command remained at Snake Creek Gap, intrenching its position, and bringing forward transportation and supplies, until May 13, when it moved out with the army. The Fourth Division, being in advance, formed on the right of the Fifteenth Army Corps (the Second Division in reserve), and advanced to Mill Creek, fronting Resaca, with the right resting on Oostenaula River. Batteries were placed in positions that commanded the town, and the division intrenched. On May 14 the Second Division, which had remained in reserve, and secure a crossing over the Oostenaula. During the afternoon a portion of the Second Brigade, Second Division (Sixty-sixth Illinois Infantry and Eight-first Ohio Infantry), crossed the river, drove the enemy from his rifle-pits, and captured a number of prisoners and 1 battle-flag. Reports having reached General Sweeny that the enemy was crossing in force at Calhoun Ferry, that office withdrew the brigade (Sixty-sixth Illinois and Eighty-first Ohio) to the north side of the river, and sent the Third Brigade to ascertain the truth in relation to the reported crossing of the enemy at Calhoun Ferry, and found the report false. During the afternoon the line of hills east of Mill Creek and directly in front of Resaca, were charged and carried. The Second Brigade, Fourth Division, Colonel (now Brigadier General) J. W. Sprague commanding, participated in the charge and received from General Woods (under whose orders he acted) great credit for the gallant and efficient manner in which it aided in carrying and holding the lines. In the charge the right of the Fifteenth Army Corps becoming much exposed, General J. C. Veatch, in order to cover and protect it, threw forward the Thirty-ninth Ohio Infantry, of the First Brigade, Fourth Division. This regiment did its works most nobly, capturing the enemy's skirmish line, including 3 commissioned officers, and held the position taken, which during the night was intrenched.

On the morning of the 15th the First Brigade, Second Division, Colonel (now Brigadier General) E. W. Rice, commanding, was thrown across the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry. The pontoon bridge was laid, and Second Brigade, Second Division, crossed. The troops had scarcely got into position when the First Brigade was attacked by a portion of Walker's division, Harder's corps, in largely superior force, which impetuously down upon the brigade. Colonel Rice, by an admirable maneuver, caught the enemy in flank, while the batteries, in position on the north side of the river, opened a direct and deadly fire upon the enemy's front, and he was soon routed and driven from the field, leaving his dead and a portion of his wounded in our hands. The Third Brigade soon came up, and was thrown across the river, and the entire division intrenched, thus placing it one the flank and rear of the enemy's army and almost directly upon his communications, which, no doubt, was one great cause leading to the evacuation of Resaca and the retreat of Johnson's army south. The loss of the Second Division in this engagement did not exceed 200 in killed, wounded, and missing, while that of the enemy was much greater, as their own report acknowledge in killed alone more than that number. Colonel E. W. Rice, who had charge of the crossing and commanded the troops in the engagement, deserves great credit for the gallant and efficient manner in which he performed his duty. His division commander (Brigadier General T. W. Sweeny) was not on the ground, and the entire direction and control of the movement fell upon him.

The following morning, May 16, I received orders to move the Fourth Division to Lay's Ferry, cross the Oostenaula, and push the entire command forward, as far as practicable, on the road to Adairsville Station. The Second Division, General Sweeny, had received orders at daylight, direct from Major-General Sherman, to move out at once and secure the Rome and Calhoun cross-roads. I arrived at the ferry about 9 a. m. with the advance of the Fourth Division, and was informed by General Sweeny that the Third Brigade only, Colonel M. M. Bane commanding, had been pushed forward. Knowing that the enemy would in all probability contest our advance on this flank, and endeavor especially to hold those roads, I ordered the other two brigades of the Second Division to move out immediately to Colonel Bane's support; and instructing General Veach to cross as rapidly as possible and follow the Second Division, I went immediately to the front, and found Colonel Bane in line of battle, skirmishing heavily along his entire front and on both flanks, and the enemy developed in heavy force in rifle-pits on his left. General Sweeny, commanding the division, not being present, I immediately ordered Colonel P. H. Burke, commanding Second Brigade, into position on Colonel Bane's right, directing him to deploy the Sixty-sixth Illinois Infantry as skirmishers. I placed the First Brigade, Colonel Rice commanding, in position on the left and rear of Colonel Bane, on a line of commanding hills that we could occupy and hold in case of an attack by a superior force of the enemy, until the balance of the army arrived. Colonel Burke had pressed his skirmishers forward on the right until they had seized the Roma and Calhoun cross-roads, which I ordered him to hold, if possible, until the Fourth Division could be brought up. General Veatch had just arrived upon the ground, and was being shown the position to be taken by his position, on the right of the Second Division, when the enemy in heavy force charged down upon the right of the Sixty-sixth Illinois Infantry, which was deployed as skirmishers, striking it in flank. This regiment, which is in part armed with the Henry rifle (seventeen-shooters), by a stubborn resistance, and a steady, cool fire checked the enemy's advance, and gave me time to throw forward to its support, and directly to the enemy's front, the balance the of Second Brigade and part of the Third Brigade. The Sixty-sixth Illinois then fell back gradually to its supports. The enemy advancing rapidly in line of battle received the fire, first, of the Eighty-first Ohio Infantry, then of the Twelfth Illinois Infantry and Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry, which checked and routed him. At the same time the enemy advanced on Colonel Burke. They moved in force around on the east side of Oothkaloga Creek, on my extreme left and rear, to a high range of hills commanding the valley and road up which my command was advancing, when they opened a battery, which for a few moments caused some confusion in rear of my line. The Second Iowa Infantry, of Colonel Rice's brigade, was immediately ordered to cross the creek and charge the battery. It moved promptly forward for that purpose, and received a heavy fire, but found the creek impassable. The enemy, however, discovering the moment, withdrew. A new line was immediately formed in an extension of the First Brigade, Second Division, on the line of hills before alluded to; the Fourth Division forming on the right of Colonel Rice, the Second and Third Brigades, Second Division, were drawn back and formed as a rear line and reserve. Major-General McPherson arrived on the ground just before the attack of the enemy and after their defeat ordered the troops to bivouac in the new position. Skirmishers were pushed forward and crossed the ground fought over. At dark the Fifteenth Army Corps arrived and formed on my right. During the night my transportation crossed the river and came up. My loss during the day was about 70 killed and wounded; that of the enemy unknown. From prisoners captured I ascertained that three divisions of Hardee's corps were intrenched at the cross-roads, covering Calhoun and the railroad. I cannot speak in terms too highly of the conduct of Colonel M. M. Bane. He found the enemy in his front in force largely superior to his own, and forming and handling his brigade with consummate skill fought it successfully. Nor can I speak too highly of the conduct of the gallant and limited Colonel P. E. Burke, commanding Second Brigade, who fell at the head of his brigade while engaged in checking the enemy's charge, and front his wounds there received died a few days after at Resaca. His loss fell heavily upon the command. An officer of acknowledge ability, he had already won the esteem and secured the confidence of all in his superior judgment on the march and in battle. In this engagement his prompt action and quick and skillful management of his three regiments, with their steady unflinching fire, converted a promised serious disaster to the command into one to the enemy.

At 7 p. m. of May 17 the command moved out toward Kingston, via McGuire's and Adairsville and Woodland roads, and after two nights and one day and a half's march reached Kingston, where transportation was reduced and twenty day's short rations for men and animals collected. May 22, the Third Brigade of the Second Division, Colonel M. M. Bane, commanding, was detached from the command and sent to Rome, Ga., to garrison that place, and did not take any further part in the campaign. On May 23 the command moved out on the Van Wert road, with orders to concentrate at Pumpkin Vine Post-Office, some ten miles south of Dallas. After three days and two nights' tedious march, as reach guard to the army, the command reached Little Pumpkin Vine Creek, ten miles southeast of Dallas, and one mile and a half south of Moody's Mills, on the direct road to Pumpkin Vine Post-Office, late in the night of the 25th. At 12 o'clock that night I received orders to move north, camp on the Van Wert and Dallas road, and be prepared at daylight to advance with the rest of the army on Dallas. The troops had hardly bivouacked, when, daylight having arrived, the advance was moved out on a cross-road, striking the main Dallas road at Pumpkin Vine Creek. A crossing was effected, the command formed in line, advanced upon, and after slight skirmishing, entered Dallas, General Jeff. C. Davis' division, of the Fourteenth Army Corps, entering at the same time from the north.

The command bivouacked about half a mile east of the town, facing a high range of hills occupied by the enemy. At daylight on the morning of the 27th the enemy pressed forward in heavy force drove in a portion of my skirmishers, and made a determined attack upon a portion of the Fifteenth Army Corps, I immediately formed the command in the following order: The Second Division on the right, connecting with left of Fifteenth Army Corps; the Fourth Division on the left, connecting with right of General Jeff. C. Davis's division, Fourteenth Army Corps. The formation perfected, our lines were advanced, driving the enemy into his works, and our line intrenching itself upon the new ground taken, batteries were placed in position and a strong skirmish line thrown forward. Heavy skirmishing was kept up constantly until 4 p. m. of the following day (May 28), when the enemy, massed in heavy columns, under cover of the timber, made a sudden assault upon our line. This first assault was promptly repulsed, but rallying and reforming his lines, he again, with increased force and impetuosity, charged and contested strongly for possession of the works, many of his dead and wounded being left within fifty yards of our lines, some, indeed, on the works. Three officers and a few enlisted men only succeeded in getting inside the works; they were either killed instantly or captured. This assault, although most desperate and determined, was promptly and gallantly met and repulsed. Welker's battery, Lieutenant A. T. Blodgett, Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry, commanding, being in a position on the front line, did most excellent execution; its constant fire of grape and canister, and the cool, steady fire of the men on the front line, told heavily upon the enemy, causing him to fall back in confusion, leaving his dead and many of his wounded in our hands. The men of my command engaged, being behind strong works which covered them, my loss was very small, while that of the enemy in my front was very large, especially in killed. One of my regiments (Sixty-sixth Indiana Infantry), having in its front alone, and within a few yards of the works, found and buried 53 dead rebels. On May 29 I received orders to withdraw the command during the night from the enemy's front and move, following the rest of the army, toward the left to a position in the vicinity of New Hope Church. During the day my transportation and hospitals were moved, and preparations in compliance with orders made for the withdrawal. At 10 p. m. the enemy (having evidently either suspicioned or discovered the movement) in heavy columns assaulted my lines, making five separate determined attacks, and although in each promptly repulsed, he kept up a continuous and heavy musketry fire along the entire front during the night, thereby necessitating a postponement of the movement for the withdrawal of the army. In the different day and night attacks made by the enemy, in front of Dallas, he suffered great loss. At no times did he move our lines one inch. In every instance he was speedily repulsed and severely punished, and left his dead and wounded in our possession. On May 31 a portion of the Fourth Division, and the Second Brigade, Second Division, Colonel August Mersy commanding, advanced, and with slight loss carried one line of the enemy's works, capturing several prisoners. The Second Brigade was soon after withdrawn and sent to the left, relieving the brigade of Colonel Mitchell, on General J. C. Davis' front.

At 7 a. m. of June 1 the movement for withdrawing the army was commenced. The First Brigade, Second Division, Colonel Rice commanding, was sent in advance to the left to occupy some new works on the Allatoona road, built to cover the withdrawal of the army. The Fourth Division brought up the rear and moved to a position near Owen's Mill, covering the roads to Van Wert. Burnt Hickory, and Kingston. After the army had passed the works occupied by Colonel Rice, the Second Division was moved to and posted on the left of the Fourth Division, filling the space between it and the Fifteenth Army Corps, and covering the Acworth road at the crossing of Little Pumpkin Vine Creek. The position taken up by the command was strongly intrenched, and batteries placed in position. On the 2nd of June the enemy attacked General Veatch's right (Fourth Division), Big Pumpkin Vine, and was speedily repulsed. On June 3 I concentrated my lines, the Fourth Division moving to the left and east of Big Pumpkin Vine Creek, with only slight skirmishing with the enemy's pickets; this position was held until June 5, when the movement toward Acworth was begun, which was completed on June 6, and the command bivouacked southwest of Acworth on the evening of that day. Quartermaster stores and a full supply of rations were brought up, and my sick and wounded as rear guard to the army, and on the following day the Fourth Division went into position near Big Shanty, its right resting on the railroad near " Moon's Siding," its left connecting with the Fifteenth Army Corps. The line was intrenched and batteries placed in position. This position was held, with constant heavy skirmishing, until June 18, when the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits in my front were charge and taken with about 50 prisoners; my loss not exceeding 100. In this charge the Thirty-fifth New Jersey Infantry displayed great gallantry; under a heavy fire it held its position for a long time after its ammunition was exhausted and until it was relieved. At daylight of June 19 the enemy evacuated his works on my front. General Veatch, by prompt movement, pressed him closely on the Burnt Hickory and Marietta road, while the First Alabama Cavalry and Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry pursued on the direct Marietta road. The enemy's new line was soon developed on my front in a strong position on the crest of Kenesaw Mountain, which he had previously fortified. The Fourth Division was moved into position facing and close upon the enemy's works, connecting on the right with the Fourteenth Army Corps and on the left with the Fifteenth Army Corps, the Second Division, as before, being held in reserve near Big Shanty. On June 22 two regiment of the Second Division were placed in position with the Fourth Division, and the entire was advanced to within 2,700 feet of the enemy's batteries. Strong works were built at once and batteries placed in good positions. This position was held, with sharp skirmishing and some artillery firing, until June 26, when the Second Division relieved a portion of the Fifteenth Army Corps.

On June 27, pursuant to orders for a general movement along the line of the armies, the Ninth Illinois Infantry, Sixty-fourth Illinois Infantry, and Sixty-sixth Illinois Infantry, were deployed and at 8 a. m. advanced upon the enemy's works at the top of Kenesaw Mountain. The natural defenses and obstructions encountered rendered the ascent of the mountain very slow and difficult, but the men advanced steadily under a galling fire until the main line of the enemy's works was reached, which however, was found too strong to carry, and the object of the movement, which was to keep the enemy from weakening his force in my front, to throw against the main charging columns on my right, being successfully accomplished, it was deemed inexpedient to attempt further to carry the works. The Sixty-fourth Illinois Infantry deserves special mention for its action this day. It secured and held a position so close to the enemy's main line of works on top of the mountain that they (the enemy) were obliged to keep closely inside of their works; its loss was heavy, and its position the most trying that soldiers could possibly be placed in. Three of its men were killed the enemy's works and several others within a few yards of the works.

This position was held, with heavy and continual skirmishing and much artillery firing, until July 2, when the command was ordered to move at 9 p. m. to the extreme right. The movement had commenced, the Second Division having moved out, when orders were received to remain in position. At daylight of the following morning (July 3) it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated, and that our skirmishers had taken possession of the mountain and works, capturing some prisoners. During the day the command moved to the right, and bivouacked on Nickajack Creek, near Ruff's Mill, the Second Division going into position and intrenching on the east side of the creek. Early in the morning of July 4 the Fourth Division moved out on the Ruff's Station road, and, encountering the enemy, pressed him steadily back for a distance of two miles, and until he was developed in strong intrenchments in heavy force.

Prisoners taken showing that Hood's entire corps was in my front, the Second Division was brought up and placed in position on the right of the Fourth Division, and the command proceeded to intrench and develop fully the enemy's position. At 4 p. m. a charging column, consisting of the Thirty-ninth Ohio Infantry, Twenty-seventh Ohio Infantry, and Sixty-fourth Illinois Infantry, of the Fourth Division, under command of Colonel E. F. Noyes; and the Eighty-first Ohio Infantry, Sixty-sixth Illinois Infantry, and Second Iowa Infantry, of the Second Division, was formed, and gallantly charged and carried the enemy's first line of works, capturing over 100 prisoners. In this charge my loss was about 140 killed and wounded. Among the latter was Colonel E. F. Noyes, Thirty-ninth Ohio Infantry, who lost a leg. A most gallant and efficient officer, beloved and admired by all, his loss to the division was, and still is, deeply felt and deployed. This line charged was soon abandoned along its entire length by the enemy, and he immediately commenced his retreat to the Chattahoochee. During the following day (July 5) the command moved to, and bivouacked at, Widow Mitchell's, on the Sandtown road. The Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry was pushed forward, and guarded Howell's and Baker[s Ferries on the Chattahoochee River. On the day following (July 6) the Second Brigade, Second Division, Colonel Mersy commanding, with one section of Fourteenth Ohio Battery, was sent to Sandtown Ferry. Skirmishers were thrown forward to the river, and the enemy developed in strong intrenchments on the south side. July 7, General Veatch moved his division (Fourth) to the forks of Howell's and Green's Ferry roads, and throwing his skirmishers forward to the banks of the Chattahoochee, he placed batteries in position and opened a heavy fire therefrom upon the enemy's position on the south side of the river. On July 9, in compliance with orders from Major-General Sherman, the command moved out on the Sandtown and Marietta road, via Marietta, en route to Roswell, and, having marched until 10 p. m., bivouacked one mile east of Marietta. The command resumed its march at 3 a. m. The infantry and one battery were immediately pushed across (fording) the Chattahoochee River, and occupied the works held by General Newton's division, of the Fourth Army Corps, which I relieved. A strong tete-de-point was thrown up to cover the bridge and crossing. A foot bridge, 700 feet long, was thrown across the river, and from Monday noon, July 10, to Wednesday night, July 12, a good, substantial double-track trestle road bridge, 710 fee long and 14 feet high, was built by the pioneer corps of, and details from the command. The march from Sandtown to Roswell, some thirty-one miles, and the crossing of the Chattahoochee and intrenching of the command was al accomplished in less than two days, under a scorching, burning sun, and was certainly one of the most laborious undertaking of the campaign; a most severe test of the endurance, patience, and spirit of the men. General Sherman fearing that the enemy (who had evacuated a portion of his front line) might send a force and secure and hold the bluffs on the south side of the river, near Roswell, urged celerity; and the alacrity and spirit with which the command met the emergency, and the skill and cheerful industry displayed by the men in building the bridge (over the entire Army of the Tennessee crossed with all its trains), entitles them to much credit, and proves that our gallant soldiers are equal to any and every emergency. The plan, stability, and workmanship of the bridge reflect much credit upon the pioneer corps of the command. The Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry opened communication, on the south side of the Chattahoochee, with the Twenty-third Army Corps.

The command remained at Roswell, bringing forward provisions, &c., preparatory to the next movement, until the morning of July 17, when it moved out on a road leading to Old Cross Keys, Decatur being the objective point. My orders required me to find and move upon a road between those used by the Twenty-third Army Corps and Seventeenth Army Corps. This necessitated the cutting of new roads and deviations from a direct route. The Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, my advance, struck the enemy at Nancy's Creek, on Old Keys road, and after a sharp skirmish drove him across the creek. The Fourth Division, Brigadier General J. W. Fuller commanding, was brought forward, deployed and drove the enemy beyond Cross Keys, taking and holding a position on the south side of the creek. Communication was established on the right with the Twenty-third Army Corps, and on the left with the Seventeenth Army Corps. At 6 a. m. (July 18) the command moved directly across the country, crossing the Peach Tree road, and striking the old Roswell and Decatur road at Window Rainey's, which it took, moving toward Decatur. The advance found the enemy in considerable force at Cressy's Branch, and drove him across Little Peach Tree Creek, on which stream the command bivouacked that night, opening communication on the right and left with the Twenty-third and Seventeenth Army Corps. On the morning of July 19 the command moved forward on the old Decatur road, and struck the Twenty-third Army Corps about two miles and a half distant from Little Peach Tree Creek. Here one of my scouts joined me, he having left Atlanta that morning, bringing the intelligence of the supersedure of Johnston by Hood, which information was immediately communicated to Generals Sherman and McPherson. The Twenty-third Army Corps having taken the Decatur road, I ordered a road cut parallel with it, upon which my command moved, and having crossed Peach Tree Creek proper, my advance, Ninth Illinois Mountain Infantry, struck the enemy in force in front of Decatur, and, driving him steadily back, entered the town with the advance of the Twenty-third Army Corps. Being ordered by General McPherson to occupy and hold the town during the night, I ordered General Fuller to place his division (Fourth) in position on a range of hills south of, and commanding, the town. As this division advanced through town, the enemy opened fire upon it with artillery posted on a range of hills west of town. General Fuller threw his division promptly into line; batteries were brought into action, and, opened fire upon, silenced the enemy's artillery. The Second Division was brought forward promptly, and placed in position on the right of the Fourth Division, and west of town. The line then advanced, and occupied and held the range of hills south and west of town. At 1 p. m. of July 20 the command moved, on the Decatur and Atlanta road, in rear of the Fifteenth Army Corps. General Logan having found the enemy in heavy force in his front, near the Three Mile House, and his right being much exposed, requested me to fill the gap intervening between him and the Twenty-third Army Corps, which I did by placing the Second Division in line on the right of the Fifteenth Army Corps, and connecting by a heavy skirmish line with the Twenty-third Army Corps. The position taken by this division was intrenched during the night. The Second Brigade, Fourth Division, Colonel (now Brigadier General) J. W. Sprague commanding, was ordered back to Decatur to relieve General Garrard's cavalry division, and guard the trains of the army.

On the morning of the 21st of July General Fuller was ordered to move the First Brigade of his division into position as a reserve to the Seventeenth Army Corps, and Light Battery F, Second U. S. Artillery, attached to Fourth Division, was placed in position on General G. A. Smith's front, Seventeenth Army Corps. The Second Division moved forward and occupied a range of hills three-quarters of a mile in advance of its former position, forming close connection on right with the Twenty-third Army Corps. The enemy contested this advance very sharply. The new line taken up was immediately intrenched and made secure. At 4 a. m. of July 22 General Sweeny, commanding Second Division, reported to me that the enemy had disappeared a heavy skirmish line, which he did ordered him to push forward a heavy skirmish line, which he did promptly, and promptly, and reported the enemy in force in works surrounding Atlanta. The forward movement made by the army that morning left the Second Division out of line, and General McPherson ordered me to move my command to the left flank of the army, to place the First Brigade of the Fourth Division in line on the left of the new position to be taken up by the Seventeenth Army Corps. and hold the remainder of the command (Second Division) in reserve.

At an early hour in the morning, I rode with General McPherson from his headquarters to the front, on the direct Atlanta road. The sudden evacuation of the enemy caused us some surprise and serious concern, and the general requested me to repair to the left, get my troops on the ground as soon as possible, and to examine the ground in front and on the left of the Seventeenth Army Corps, which I hastened to do. The enemy allowed myself and staff to approach their works on the south side of Atlanta to within easy musket range without firing a shot. When I turned about, however, to return in the direction of the old line, they opened a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon us. I selected the ground to be occupied by my command, and sent orders for General Fuller to send out working parties to intrench his line, and for the Second Division to move to the rear of the seventeenth Army Corps and bivouac. Before these orders could be executed the command was attacked by the enemy in heavy fire. For report of the battle that ensued, I respectfully refer to my report of that date, July 22, which is hereto attached and made a part hereof, marked A.* The fortunate position of the command, and the prompt manner in which it formed and received the attacks; the cool, stubborn bravery with which it met and hurled back, and broke and scattered the columns of an enemy outnumbering it at least three to one, no doubt prevented a serious disaster to the Army of the Tennessee, if not to the entire army. Colonel Sprague, commanding at decatur, saved the trains of the army, and covered and held the Rowell road. For his uniform good conduct during the campaign, and especially his gallant services in this action, he was immediately promoted to brigadier-general of volunteers. During the engagement, I received an order directing me to send the Fourth Division to destroy railroad from Decatur, east. This order had evidently ben issued in the morning, and its delivery to me from some reason delayed, and the command being heavily engaged with the enemy at the time of its receipt, rendered compliance with it impossible.

The line taken in the evening, and held any intrenched during the night of the 22d, was strengthened on the following day (July 23); Colonel Mersy's brigade (Second), of Second Division, was distributed by regiments on the line of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps; Sprague's brigade (Second), Fourth Division, reoccupied Decatur.

During the 24th July Sprague's brigade was employed, assisting General Woods' division, Fifteenth Army Corps, in destroying the railroad between Atlanta and Decatur. The pioneer corps of the command were set to work constructing a line of works in rear of the occupied line for use during the execution of the contemplated movement of the army. The caissons of Light Battery F, Second U. S. Artillery, were discovered between our own and the enemy's skirmish lines, and were taken possession of and brought in by details made for that purpose. On the afternoon of July 25 Sprague's brigade rejoined the Fourth Division. Brigadier General T. W Sweeny was relieved from command and placed under arrest, and was ordered to Nashville by Major-General Sherman, and Colonel (now Brigadier General) E. W. Rice assumed command of the Second Division. Colonel August Mersy's term of service having expired, he was, at his own request, relieved from command of the second Brigade, Second Division, and Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Phillips, Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, was assigned to command the brigade. During the night of the 26th of July the command drew out of its works and moved to, and halted in rear of, the Fourth Army Corps, the Second Brigade, Fourth Division, covering the rear, and occupying a line of works near to and parallel with the decatur and Atlanta road, until the withdrawal was effected. July 27, the command moved out, passing in rear of the Army of the Cumberland, and crossed Proctor's Creek. Brigadier Gen J. M. Corse, acting inspector-general on staff of Major-General Sherman, was, at my request, permanently assigned to command the Second Division, and being in the advance, his division deployed soon after crossing Proctor's Creek, and moving forward drove the enemy steadily back, and went into position, by successive brigades, on the west side of Atlanta, facing due east, and forming connection on his left with the right of the Army of the Cumberland. General Fuller, commanding Fourth Division, went into position in similar manner, forming on General Corse's right. During night the line was intrenched. The forenoon of July 28 was occupied by the command in completing its intrenchments, constructing forts, and placing batteries in position. At 2 p. m. I sent the Eighty-first Ohio Infantry and Twelfth Illinois Infantry, of Second Brigade, Second Division, under command of Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Philips, to re-enforce the Fifteenth Army Corps, which being at the time heavily engaged, these regiments went immediately into action. I also soon after sent the Sixty-third Ohio Thirty-fifth New Jersey Infantry, of the Fourth Division, under command of Colonel J. J. Cladek, as additional re-enforcements, and they took immediately part in the engagement.

As these regiments reported to Major-General Logan, they fought under his direction, and I can not make a detail report of the part they took in the action; I am informed, however, that their arrival upon the ground was very opportune, and that they went gallantly and promptly into action. Their loss was about 40 killed and wounded. The Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry was sent to Turner's Ferry, with orders to pickett all roads leading to our right and rear. July 29, 30, 31, and August 1, were spent in daily skirmishing, occasional unimportant changes in the line, and some artillery practice.

August 2, Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom was assigned to command the Fourth Division. August 3, the skirmish line advanced somewhat, holding the ground gained. August 4, I received orders to advance the entire command, as a diversion in favor of Major-General Schofield's movement to the right, and to occupy a line of hills about 1,000 yards distant from the enemy's works. At 2 p. m. the command advanced. The Second Division captured the enemy's first line of rifle-pits, and, after severe fighting by a portion of this division, during which it was driven from, and recaptured, these pits three times, the enemy was driven back, and the line taken was intrenched that night and held by a double line of skirmishers. On account of a change of line to the rear by the command on its right, the Fourth Division was obliged to fall back from its advanced position, which it did, and threw up and occupied an intermediate line of works, connecting on the right with the Seventeenth Army Corps, and on the left with the Second Division. My loss in this advance was about 70 in killed, wounded, and missing, being, I think, small, considering the exposed position taken, the enemy having close range with artillery and musketry, especially on the position of the Second Division. During August 6, 7, and 8, the entire line advance to the last range of hills fronting Atlanta, and in plain view of the city. This line was heavily intrenched, strong forts constructed, and batteries casemated, and a steady fire kept up upon the enemy's works and the city. During this advance the enemy contested stubbornly every inch of ground, and, by his excellent artillery practice and continuous musketry fire at close range, inflicted a heavy loss to my command in killed and wounded. During August 9 and 10 a brisk fire of artillery and musketry was interchanged day in night. August 11, and skirmish line was strengthened, advanced, and carried the enemy's line, gaining some very commanding ground, and driving the enemy into his main works. The captured line was intrenched, forts constructed, and batteries placed in them, and orders issued directing that every gun in the command should open upon any battery of the enemy that should be developed with in our reach. This had an excellent effect. The enemy's artillery kept more quiet, indeed, nearly silent, while we kept up a continuous and damaging fire, day and night, upon the enemy's line and the city from our field batteries and one 4 1\2 -inch ordnance gun. August 17, orders were received directing a movement to the rear of Atlanta, and preparations, thereto were accordingly made. During the night, however, orders from department headquarters were received suspending the movement, and the command resumed its former attitude. On the morning of August 19, while engaged in superintending preparations for taking a detached work of the enemy on my right. I was severely wounded, and relinquished the command to Brigadier General T. E. G. Ransom, to whose report I respectfully refer for accounts of the part taken by the corps during the balance of the campaign.

During the campaign the command marched about 500 miles, was engaged in thirteen distinct engagements, and was under fire during almost the entire campaign. It captured from the enemy 727 prisoners, 11 battle-flags, about 2,500 stand of small-arms. With much other material. Its losses foot up as follows: Killed, 376; wounded, 1,799; missing, 202.

I feel that but one thing occurred to mar the entire success of the campaign-the loss of our brave, talented, young and idolized commander, our noble and gifted Mcherson. The full measure of his loss cannot be estimated, or the pain and sorrow shared by all computed. Although he met a soldier's death, it was hard, very hard, to part with him.

To, General Veatch, Fuller, Corse, and Ransom, who commanded the divisions of the corps during the campaign. I tender my warmest thanks. Always prompt, giving their personal attention to all movements, and working with that harmony which is requisite for full across, they are entitled to much of the credit due the corps for the successful part taken by it in the campaign. The brigade commanders also, without exception, performed fully and well their part of the arduous and trying duties of the campaign.

I taken great pleasure in calling the attention of the commanding general to the reports of my division, brigade, regimental, and battery commanders for full and explicit accounts of the part taken by each, and to their special mention of officers and enlisted men for murderers conduct and efficient service rendered during the campaign. I earnestly request that all such may receive proper attention.

I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the good conduct and services of my staff, officers during the entire campaign. Colonel George E. Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry Volunteers, and Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Phillips, Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, served on my staff during portions of the campaign, and rendered me valuable aid. Each of these officers has often before received my commendations for gallant and efficient services in other duty, and I take pleasure in again calling the attention of the commanding general to them.

Captain James M. McClintock was in command of the signal corps attached to my command, and rendered valuable services throughout the campaign, not only in his particular duty as signal officer, but in reconnoitering and scouting. I bear cheerful testimony of the efficiency of and aid rendered by himself and corps. The report of Captain McClintock details fully his operations, and I respectfully refer the general commanding to it.

Lieutenant Colonel D. F. Tiedemann, acting chief to of engineers; Major W. H. Ross, chief of artillery; Major Norman Gay, medical director; Captain William Kossak, chief of engineers; Captain H. L. Burnham, provost-marshal-general; Captain Thomas C. Fullerton, acting assistant inspector-general; Cap. W. H. Chamberlin, assistant commissary of musters; Captain W. W. DeHeus (on special duty, and was captured by the enemy at Tilton, Ga.) and Lieutenant N. R. Park, ordnance officer, all performed their respective duties faithfully and well. Often kept awake night after night, they cheerfully and without complaint met every demand to my own and the entire satisfaction of the chiefs of their respective departments.

Major J. W. Barnes, my assistant adjutant-general, had entire control of the adjutant's office, the arduous duties of which he performed with great credit to himself and the corps. He never rested until the labors that the day imposed upon him were fully accomplished.

Captain J. K. King, assistant quartermaster, and Captain C. C. Carpenter, commissary of subsistence, are each entitled to great credit for the faithful and efficient manner in which they discharged their laborious duties. Although often laboring under very great difficulties, in no instance did they fail to have on hand, at the proper time, full supplies for the command.

My personal staff, Captain George E. Ford, Fourth Iowa Infantry; Lieutenant George C. Tichenor, Thirty-ninth Iowa Infantry; and Lieutenant Edward Jonas, Fiftieth Illinois Infantry, have placed me under very many obligations for the intelligent, efficient, cheerful, and satisfactory manner in which they performed all duties assigned them.

In battle, on the march, in the trench, or in camp, they have never failed, but were always found where duty called them.

I am under many obligations for aid and kindness received from the staff officers at department headquarters, who always responded promptly to our wants, and met every request with alacrity; and especially am I indebted to Lieutenant Colonel William T. Clark, assistant adjutant-general, and Captain C. B. Reese, chief engineer, Department and Army of the Tennessee.

My report has been delayed from the fact that I have, on account of my wounds, been absent from the command, and unable to get access to the papers and records necessary to its proper completion.

Tabular statements of losses, captures, &c., and maps,* showing the routes marched and each position taken by the command during the campaign, are hereto annexed, and respectfully submitted as a part hereof.

During my absence the command has been assigned to other corps, and I would not be doing justice to my own feelings of to the command did I fail to state that I have to part with it with great reluctance. I believe I do not exaggerate when I say that throughout the entire army, among officer and men, a more intelligent, brave,patriotic, and harmonious command did not exist. Most of the officers, and men have served under me for over two years, and during all that time nothing has occurred to mar the agreeable freedom of our intercourse. They have never been called upon the perform any duty that they have promptly, cheerfully, and successfully responded. From Corinth to Atlanta they have hewn their way without one reserve, leaving the impress of their work in Mississippi, Tennessee. Alabama, and Georgia, where many -very very -many of their comrades' graves mark the scenes of their valor, labor, and success. With whatever commands their fortunes may hereafter be cast I am certain that they will prove, as in the past have done, that no better or more successful soldiers grace any of our armies.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. DODGE,

Major-General.

Lieutenant Colonel W. T. CLARK,

Asst. Adjt. General, Dept. and Army of the Tennessee.