Page 609-614

DALTON, GA., February 7, 1864.

Honorable ROBERT JEMISON, Jr.,

Richmond, Va.:

DEAR SIR: You will see from the accompanying letter of Colonel Saunders our business here. We had yesterday a favorable interview with General Wheeler, but the reverse with General Johnston, his idea being mainly that he had too much territory to defend, and that it was better to consolidate his forces. We desired very much to give him the points of greatest public interest, but he expressed familiarity with them; still we pressed a brief and unsatisfactory statementk of the coal, iron, and railroad interests in the Cahaba fields. A single raid will derange and stampede the whole system, upon which the Government is so much dependent. Such a thing is inevitable. Should General Roddey be removed the destruction of the ten or twelveiron furnaces, cutting the railroads and suspending the daily supply of coal in all that latitude, dispersing the very large forces of hands engaged in those works, including those at work on the Central Railroad, necessary to all the other enterprises, all affecting the vitality of the Confederacy, will most certainly follow. All of North Alabama will be uncovered. The Government works at Selma, especially a fine gun-boat or two, and private interests to an incalculable extent, must thereby incur extreme hazard. In our own part of the State complete destruction must follow. The Tennessee Valley should be protected as a grain country. It is in ahigh latitude and of immense capacity, and we can at all times support a good army. The Tennessee River affords an easy line of defense. General Roddey has held it against the body of the Army of the Cumberland, though we suppose the enemy or eon the north side to obtain subsistence mainly. The river is now forded along the Muscle Shoals, and they appear in great numbers on the opposite bank. North Alabama is the gateway to Middle Tennessee, from whence we obtain recruits, stock, and most of the subsistence for those troops immediately upon the river. General Roddey's troops are made up in North Alabama, and naturally they prefer to remain in front of their own homes. His command is in process of organization and large increase. To remove it at this time one-half of it we fear might be lost to the service. General Roddey is mild, conciliating, and popular, and can concentrate the mountain population between Tuscaloosa and the Tennessee River. Fifteen or more companites are organizing, which it is almost certain will be suspended. The Secretary of War declared that General Roddey's command would not be removed. We desire the general good, and are not influenced by any narrow, selfish view. We had expected that in the spring the enemy would move toward East Tennessee, and that General Roddey would move correspondingly, and when there would not exist the same necessity for his remaining in his present position. The extreme distress of our people, having suffered unutterably, will be increased at the imepending danger, and their sacrifices consequent upon their devotion and loyalty demand the highest consideration of their interests.

We asked General Johnston to modify his order to remove General Patterson and Pickett, as already ordered by General Roddey, from Okolona, Miss., to Gadsden, and to place Colonel Hannon west of the Sand Mountain, his right resting against it and his left upon the Tennessee River and near the eastern boundary of Morgan County. This region can subsist that regiment, and it will be in eacy communication with Gadsden or the Tennessee Valley west and facing the enemy. Also we asked that Lieutenant-Colonel Moreland's battalion be left to picket the Tennessee River in conjunction with Colonel Johnson's regiment (Fourth Alabama Cavalry), the order having been to retain oneof General Roddey's best regiments for that purpose. Major George is in command at Corinth, by which much subsistence andmany recruits already enrolled are to be brought out of West Tennessee. If nothing elsecan be had, this might give confidence and induce the people of the valley to engage heartily in the productive of grain. We trust that you will in conjunction with your colleagues be able to do thus much.

Very respectfully,

John D. RATHER.

J. W. S. DONNELL.

P. S.-I forgot to say that in our interview with General Wheeler he readily assented to revoke the order to General Roddey to remove his command to Gadsden, but said it was done by direction of General Johnston. He at once laid the matter before General Johnston, and gave us his reasons for declining, and which he (General Johnston) repeated to us. We desire, therefore, to acquit General Wheller of any purpose to leave North Alabama unprotected, as seems to be inferred by Colonel Saunders. This much is due to General Wheeler touching the removal of General Roddey. We shall notify Governor Watts and invoke his aid and counsels in the matter. We understand that he proposed on a similar occasion when General Roddey was ordered out of North Alabama to send State troops in their places.

J. D. R.

J. W. S. D.

[Inclosure.]

COURTLAND, ALA., January 30, 1864.

Honorable ROBERT JEMISON:

DEAR SIR: The inclosed is a copy of a letter witten to Major-General Wheeler, and will show you the danger with which North Alabama is threatened. Mr. Donnell, the excellent member of Assembly from Limestone County, carries the letter to Dalton, and will advise you by postscript of his success at headquarters in getting the order rescinded. Major-General Wheeler has been quite unsuccessful since his nomination, and has neither the confidence of officers nor men. His force has been continually running down, and for some time he has manifested a strong desire to remove Brigadier-General Roddey's force from North Alabama to swell the numbers under his immediate command. An order of the same kind was issued just before the battle of Chickamauga, and rescinded upon a memorial to General Bragg. Of Major-General Wheeler I shall speak freely, but with that sense of justice which should govern every gentlemen in speaking of another. As a brigadier he was successful, sober, industrious, and methodical. He succeeded well in organizing, but when the field of his operations was enlarged, the draft on his intellect, wich is one of mediocrity, became too heavy. He has signally failed to give satisfaction. Moreover, his person is small, and in his manner there is nothing manly and commanding. He evidently handles men awkwardly in battle, for he has but few engaged at a time. In short, I condier that the interest of the service in this department demands that the Senate should refuse to confirm General Wheeler's nomination. If, however, it could be done, I would not object to his being confirmed on a new appointment. This would place him in rank where, considering his youth and just claims, he should be, viz, behind Wharton and Martin and Lee (S. D.) and Forrest, either of whom is his superior in the field.

You must judge what is the best course to pursue with the matter of General Roddey's removal with his force from North Alabama, after consulting with other members from this section. When General Rather recently returned from Richmond he brought on some paper, I understand, an indorsement of the Secretary of War pledging himself that the force of General Roddey should not be removed from North Alabama. Perhaps it would be best to wait on the Secretary of War at once and advise him of the great error about to be committed, which may lose to us all the advantages which might be repeated from the evacuation of Corinth by opening to the enemy any road which they may choose to travel to our public works in Central Alabama. Since the letter was written to General Wheeler dispatches have been received by General Roddey showing the cause of General Wheeler's anxiety. On the 26th instant some infantry and mounted men (mostly infantry) crossed at Larkin's Ferry, eighteen miles above Guntersville, and moved to Wakefield, ten miles east of Guntersville, and returned to the landing on the 28th, probably to recross. When the precise facts are ascertained I predict that the movement was a feint to cause Roddey's force to move eastward, so that they may cross farther west for some purpose. On last Monday General Roddey crossed the Tennessee and drove them from their camp, capturing everything they had. Roddey's force is constantly increasing and amounts nearly to 4,000 men. The state of the war now demands that Congress should act promptly. What is requisite [is] to fill up the Army. The spring will open with the most active operations all along the line. I indulge the hope that by a stubborn resistance our people will ere long achieve their independence. The longer the contest shall continue the more the funds of the Federals will depreciate and the hope of conequest wane.

Your friend and servant,

JAMES E. SAUNDERS.

There is now a sa to Courtland.

[Sub-inclosure.]

ROCKY HILL,

Near Courtland, Ala., January 30, 1864.

Major General JOSEPH WHEELER:

DEAR SIR: I returned home last night, and after dark Brigadier-General Roddey passed by on his way to Tuscumbia to prepare his men for the march to Gadsden, in pursuance of your last order, which he showed me, with the letter accompanying it. I deeply regret the necessity for removing the cavalry from North Alabama, and with your permission will submit a few facts and thoughts connected with the policy of the movement. It will uncover the valley south of the Tennessee, embracing the corn lands in the valley proper, from Bear Creek to Flint River (above Decatur), and the secondary valleys about Russellville, Mount Hope, Moulton, and Danville (at the head of Flint). Corinth has been recently evacuated and is now in our hands, and the minds of the farmers were undergoing a healthy reaction, and many who had fledfrom their homes in the country nearet to that strong hold, from which the Federals have so long annoyed us, had determined to return to their plantations and raise provisions with new energy. But your late order will, when generally known, not only arrest this reaction, but cause an exodus of the slave population over the mountains into the heart of the Confederacy, already overcharged with consumers. The enemy will most certainly cross the river at several points, especially at Decatur; will fortify themselves and get a firm hold; for what is one regiment of men which you propose to leave here, subdivided into picketsk from the mouth of Bear Creek, by Florence, Bainbridge, Lamb's Ferry, Brown's Ferry (above where you forded the Tennessee River), Decatur, Fletcher's Ferry, and other ferries to Whitesburg, consistuting a picket-line of upward of 100 miles in a straight direction, without computing the meanderings of the river. They (the enemy), if they shall succeeded in thus unexpectedly occupying a valley heretofore defended by us, particularly when Sherman's corps essayed to pass though it to re-enforce Grant with great obstinacy, may resume the idea of a railroad communication continuously from Stevenson via Decatur and Corinth with Memphis and reoccupy Corinth, the inducement to hold which place was relatively so small while we held the valley above and the communication with the Federal army in Tennessee cut off. In such a state of things our troops now here would have to find a base beyond the broad sterile mountain which stretches from the Coosa River across our State in a westerly direction. They would be compelled to rest on a line from Tuscaloosa by Jones' Valley to the Coosa, and whenever they struck at the enemy would have to traverse a barren country of over 100 miles, and then enter a valley fertile in soil, it is true, but swept of its provisions by the Federals.

To my kind the evacuation of Corinth was a measure of great benefit to General Johnston's army. It was a submission to the effort of our cavalry here and under General Forrest in West Tennessee to destroy railroad communication with Memphis. The effect wqas eitherk to cause them to give up that district of country or hold it by large garrisons, which would seriously weaken their grand army in Tennessee. Should the evacuation of Middle Tennessee by the effect, our cavalry under Forrest, and that under General Roddey, lining the Tennessee River from Guntersville and Whitesburg on the flank of the enemy all around to Savannah, and on its rear to Reynoldsburg, could cross that stream with 10,000 men (which they will have by the summer), or move eastwardly to flank the enemy in case of an advance to the south, and thus render very material service to your army. The views submitted above have reference to the military importance of this section of country and the inconveniences of its loss. I judge, however, from a clause in your letter to General Roddey, intimating that orders may arrest his march on the way, that you are alive to the considerations I have set forth. It seems to me that General Roddey's force would be more efficient in preventing and overhauling any raid of the enemy south by being judicously posted in North Alabama than south of the Coosa River. Selma is now the greatest point of manufacturing importance in General Johnston's department. The shops in Georgia, since the coal minesabout Chattanooga were occpupied by the enemy, are waning in importance. General Grant, too, has his eye upon Selma. It has not been long since he seduced a large number of workmen from this place. Now, if our cavalry are supposed to be east or south of Gadsden, and North Alabama open to the enemy, or with only one regiment, which would amount to the same thing, in making a raid to destroy our public works in Selma the enemy might cross at Whitesburg and pass down by Blountsville, Elyton, and Montevallo, and b way before it would be known to you, and return by Tuscaloosa, Fayetteville, Pikeville, and along the left bank of Bear Creek to Eastport, where they generally have transports; or they may start from Eastport, the point from which Colonel Streight took his departure, and effect his object with much less interference, provided North Alabama is bare of troops.

The state of things in the mountain, between here and Columbus, is becoming bad, especially in parts of Marion, Walker, and Winston Counties. The tory influence amongst these poor ignorant people is considerable. Added to this a great many have deserted from our Army and are hiding in the mountains. When Colonel Patterson, a few days since, marched, through Marion his encampment was twice attacked by tories in one night. On Monday last one of our conscript cavalry, named Asbury, was killed by a deserter. A man named Captain May, formerly adjutant of Colonel Patterson's regiment, and expelled on account of atrocities, has raised an independent command (unless it belongs to conscript service), and is acting with great cruelty toward the wives and families of men suspected of being disaffected to our cause, taking all their movable property, even to the convering on their beds. A few days since Judge Curtis, of the probate court of Winston County, was arrested by a squad of cavalry (conscript I presume), and on his way to the jail in Jasper was murdered and his body found secreted in arock house. The troops raised for the conscript service should be ordered into the field. I believe General Roddey could pacify the mountain and add one or two more regiments from it to the Army, provided he had undistrubed control of the First Congressional District. If something is not done speedily civil war in its worst forms of conflagration and murder will sweep over this country.

Your friend and servant,

JAMES E. SAUNDERS.

[First indorsement.]

We respectfully submit the withins. J. E. Saunders and John D. Rather to the Secretary of War.

Considering the immense value of the iron-worksk and coal mines in Middle Alabama, and the great importance of the works now at Selma, it seems to us highly necessary to protect them, and if possible an adquate force for that purpose should be put south of the Tennessee River in Alabama. If General Roddey cannot be sent back, some other force should be added to the small command left there.

C. D. CLAY, Jr.

R. JEMISON, Jr.

[Second indorsement.]

We concur in the foregoing recommendations.

DAVID CLOPTON. F. S. LYON.

THOS. J. FOSTER. T. S. DARGAN.

J. L. PUGH. John P. RALLS.

W. P. CHILTON. J. L. M. CURRY.

[Third indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 15, 1864.

The importance of this district is appreciated. As far as resources will allow, it will be the aim of the Department to protect it.

J. A. S[EDDON],

Secretary.